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ADN
The Adaptive Dynamics Network at
IIASA fosters the development of new
mathematical and conceptual tech-
niques for understanding the evolution
of complex adaptive systems.
Focusing on these long-term implica-
tions of adaptive processes in systems
of limited growth, the Adaptive Dy-
namics Network brings together scien-
tists and institutions from around the
world with IIASA acting as the central
node.
Scientific progress within the network
is reported in the IIASA Studies in
Adaptive Dynamics series.
THE ADAPTIVE DYNAMICS NETWORK
The pivotal role of evolutionary theory in life sciences derives from its capability to
provide causal explanations for phenomena that are highly improbable in the physico-
chemical sense. Yet, until recently, many facts in biology could not be accounted for in
the light of evolution. Just as physicists for a long time ignored the presence of chaos,
these phenomena were basically not perceived by biologists.
Two examples illustrate this assertion. Although Darwin’s publication of “The Origin
of Species” sparked off the whole evolutionary revolution, oddly enough, the popula-
tion genetic framework underlying the modern synthesis holds no clues to speciation
events. A second illustration is the more recently appreciated issue of jump increases
in biological complexity that result from the aggregation of individuals into mutualistic
wholes.
These and many more problems possess a common source: the interactions of individ-
uals are bound to change the environments these individuals live in. By closing the
feedback loop in the evolutionary explanation, a new mathematical theory of the evolu-
tion of complex adaptive systems arises. It is this general theoretical option that lies at
the core of the emerging field of adaptive dynamics. In consequence a major promise
of adaptive dynamics studies is to elucidate the long-term effects of the interactions
between ecological and evolutionary processes.
A commitment to interfacing the theory with empirical applications is necessary both
for validation and for management problems. For example, empirical evidence indi-
cates that to control pests and diseases or to achieve sustainable harvesting of renewable
resources evolutionary deliberation is already crucial on the time scale of two decades.
The Adaptive Dynamics Network has as its primary objective the development of mathe-
matical tools for the analysis of adaptive systems inside and outside the biological realm.
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Abstract
In the Ultimatum Game, two players are offered a chance to win a certain sum of money.
All they must do is divide it. The proposer suggests how to split the sum. The responder
can accept or reject the deal. If the deal is rejected, neither player gets anything. The
rational solution, suggested by game theory, is for the proposer to offer the smallest possible
share and for the responder to accept it. If humans play the game, however, the most
frequent outcome is a fair share. In this paper, we develop an evolutionary approach to
the Ultimatum Game. We show that fairness will evolve if the proposer can obtain some
information on what deals the responder has accepted in the past. Hence, the evolution
of fairness, similar to the evolution of cooperation, is linked to reputation.
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Fairness Versus Reason in the Ultimatum Game
Martin A. Nowak
Karen M. Page
Karl Sigmund
The Ultimatum Game is quickly catching up with the Prisoner’s Dilemma as a prime
showpiece of apparently irrational behavior. In the last two decades, it has inspired dozens
of theoretical and experimental investigations. The rules of the game are surprisingly
simple. Two players have to agree on how to split a sum of money. The proposer makes
an offer. If the responder accepts, the deal goes ahead. If the responder rejects, neither
player gets anything. In both cases, the game is over. Obviously, rational responders
should accept even the smallest positive offer, since the alternative is getting nothing.
Proposers, therefore, should be able to claim almost the entire sum. In a large number
of human studies, however, conducted with different incentives in different countries, the
majority of proposers offer 40-50% of the total sum, and about half of all responders reject
offers below 30%1−6.
The irrational human emphasis on a fair division suggests that players have preferences
which do not depend solely on their own payoff, and that responders are ready to punish
proposers offering only a small share by rejecting the deal (which costs less to themselves
than to the proposers). But how do these preferences come about? One possible explana-
tion is that the players do not grasp that they interact only once. Humans are accustomed
to repeated interactions. Repeating the Ultimatum Game is like haggling over a price,
and fair splits are more likely6−8. Another argument is based on the view that allowing
a co-player to get a large share is conceding a relative advantage to a direct rival. This
argument holds only for very small groups, however: a simple calculation shows that re-
sponders should only reject offers that are less than 1/N -th of the total sum, where N is
the number of individuals in the group9. A third explanation is based on the idea that
a substantial proportion of humans maximize a subjective utility function different from
the payoff10−12.
Here we studied the Ultimatum Game from the perspective of evolutionary game
theory13. To discuss this model, both analytically and by means of computer simulations,
we set the sum which is to be divided equal to 1, and assume that players are equally
likely to be in one of the two roles. Their strategies are given by two parameters p and
q ∈ [0, 1]. When proposer, the player offers the amount p. When responder, the player
rejects any offer smaller than q. The parameter q can be seen as an aspiration level. It
is reasonable to assume that the share kept by the player when proposer, 1 − p, should
not be smaller then the aspiration level, q. Therefore only strategies with p+ q ≤ 1 were
considered14.
The expected payoff for a player using strategy S1 = (p1, q1) against a player using
S2 = (p2, q2) is given (up to the factor 1/2, which we henceforth omit) by (a) 1− p1 + p2
if p1 ≥ q2 and p2 ≥ q1; (b) 1 − p1 if p1 ≥ q2 and p2 < q1 ; (c) p2 if p1 < q2 and p2 ≥ q1;
and (d) 0 if p1 < q2 and p2 < q1.
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Before studying the full game, with its continuum of strategies, let us first con-
sider a so-called minigame with only two possible offers h and l (high and low), with
0 < l < h < 1/29,15. There are four different strategies (l, l), (h, l), (h, h) and (l, h), which
we enumerate, in this order, by G1 to G4. G1 is the ‘reasonable’ strategy of offering little
and rejecting nothing (for the cognoscenti: it is the only subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
of the minigame16). G2 makes a high offer but is willing to accept a low offer. G3 is the
‘fair’ strategy, offering and demanding a high share. For the sake of exposition, we omit
G4, which gets eliminated anyway. To describe the change in the frequencies x1, x2 and x3
of the strategies G1, G2 and G3, respectively, we use the replicator equation. It describes
a population dynamics where successful strategies spread, either by cultural imitation or
biological reproduction17. Under these dynamics, the reasonable strategy G1 will even-
tually reach fixation. Populations that consist only of G1 and G3 players will converge
to pure G1 or G3 populations depending on the initial frequencies of the two strategies.
Mixtures of G1 and G2 players will always tend to G1, but mixtures of G2 and G3 players
are neutrally stable and subject to random drift. Hence, starting with any mixture of G1,
G2 and G3 players, evolution will always lead to a population that consists entirely of G1
players18. Reason dominates fairness.
Let us now introduce the possibility that players can obtain information about previous
encounters. In this case, individuals have to be careful about their reputation: if they
accept low offers, this may become known, and the next proposer may think twice about
making a high offer. Assume, therefore, that the average offer of an h-proposer to an l-
responder is lowered by an amount a. Even if this amount is very small – possibly because
obtaining information on the co-player is difficult, or because the information may be
considered unreliable by h-proposers – the effect is drastic19. In a mixture of h-proposers
only, the fair strategy, G3 dominates. The whole system is now bistable: depending on the
initial condition, either the reasonable strategy G1 or the fair strategy G3 reaches fixation
(Fig. 1). In the extreme case, where h-proposers have full information on the responder’s
type and offer only l when they can get away with it, we observe a reversal of the game:
G3 reaches fixation while mixtures between G1 and G2 are neutrally stable. Intuitively,
this reversal occurs because it is now the responder who has the initiative: it is up to the
proposer to react.
For 0 < a < h− l, G3 risk-dominates
20: this implies that whenever one adds stochastic
fluctuations to the population (by allowing mutation, for instance, or spatial diffusion) the
fair strategy will supersede the reasonable one in the long run (Fig. 1).
Let us now study the evolutionary dynamics on the continuum of all strategies, S(p, q).
Consider a population of N players. In every generation, several random pairs are formed.
Suppose each player will be proposer on average r times and be responder the same number
of times. The payoffs of all individuals are then summed up. For the next generation,
individuals leave a number of offspring proportional to their total payoff. Offspring adopt
the strategy of their parents, plus or minus some small random value. Thus this system
includes selection and mutation. As before, we can interpret these dynamics as denoting
biological or cultural reproduction. We observe that the evolutionary dynamics lead to a
state where all players adopt strategies that are close to the rational strategy, S(0, 0).
Let us now add the possibility that a proposer can sometimes obtain information on
what offers have been accepted by the responder in the past. We stress that the same
players need not meet twice. We assume that a proposer will offer, whatever is smaller,
his own p-value or the minimum offer that he knows has been accepted by the responder
during previous encounters. In addition, we include a small probability that proposers
will make offers that are reduced by a small randomly chosen amount. This effect allows
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Figure 1: Fairness dominates in the mini-ultimatum game, if proposers have some chance of
finding out whether responders might accept a low offer. There are three strategies: the reasonable
strategy, G1(l, l), offers and accepts low shares; the fair strategy, G3(h, h), offers and accepts high
shares; the strategy G2(h, l) offers high shares but is willing to accept low shares. If there is no
information on the responder’s type, a = 0, then the reasonable strategy G1 dominates the overall
dynamics: G1 and G3 are bistable, G2 and G3 are neutral, but G1 dominates G2. If there is some
possibility of obtaining information on the responder’s type, then we assume that h-proposers will
reduce their average offers to l-responders by an amount, a. For 0 < a < h − l, both G1 and G3
dominate G2. G1 and G3 are still bistable, but the fair strategy has the larger basin of attraction;
adding noise or spatial affects will favor fairness. In the special limit, a = h − l, which can be
interpreted as having full information on the responders type, the game is reversed: G1 and G2
are neutral, while G3 dominates G2; G3 is the only strict Nash solution. The figure shows the flow
of evolutionary game dynamics17 on the edge of the simplex S 18,19
3
.
a proposer to test for responders who are willing to accept low offers. Hence, p can be
seen as a proposer’s maximum offer, while q represents a responder’s minimum acceptance
level. Each accepted deal is made known to a fraction w of all players. Thus, individuals
who accept low offers run the risk of receiving reduced offers in the future. In contrast,
the costly act of rejecting a low offer buys the reputation that one accepts only fair offers.
Figure 2 shows that this process can readily lead to the evolution of fairness. The average
p and q values depend on the number of games per individual, r, and the fraction w of
individuals who find out about any given interaction. Larger r and w values lead to fairer
solutions.
Hence, evolutionary dynamics – in accordance with the predictions of economic game
theory – lead to rational solutions in the basic Ultimatum Game. Thus, one need not
assume that the players are rational utility-maximizers to predict the prevalence of low
offers and low aspiration levels. Whatever the evolutionary mechanism – learning by trial
and error, imitation, inheritance – it always promotes the same reasonable outcome: low
offers, low demands.
If, however, we include the possibility that individuals can obtain some information
on which offers have been accepted by others in previous encounters, the outcome is
dramatically different. Under these circumstances, evolutionary dynamics tend to favor
strategies that demand and offer a fair share of the prize. This effect, which does not
require the same players to interact twice, suffices to keep the aspiration levels high.
Accepting low offers damages the individual’s reputation within the group and increases
the chance of receiving reduced offers in subsequent encounters. Rejecting low offers is
costly, but the cost is offset by gaining the reputation of somebody who insists on a fair
offer. When reputation is included in the Ultimatum Game, adaptation favors fairness over
reason. In this most elementary game, information on the co-player fosters the emergence
of strategies that are nonrational, but promote economic exchange. This agrees well
with findings on the emergence of cooperation21 or of bargaining behavior22. Reputation
based on commitment and communication plays an essential role in the natural history of
economic life23.
3
Figure 2: Fairness evolves in computer simulations of the Ultimatum Game, if a sufficiently
large fraction, w, of players is informed about any one accepted offer. Each player is defined by
an S(p, q) strategy with p+ q ≤ 1 (14). In any one interaction, a random pair of players is chosen.
The proposer will offer – whatever is smaller – his own p value or the lowest amount that he knows
was accepted by the responder during previous interactions. In addition there is a small (0.1)
probability that the responder will offer his p value minus some random number between 0 and
0.1; this is to test for players who are willing to accept reduced offers. The total population size
is N = 100. Individuals reproduce proportional to their payoff. Offspring adopt their parent’s
p and q values plus a random number from the interval (−0.005,+0.005). There are on average
r = 50 rounds per player per generation in both roles. Equilibrium p and q values are shown
averaged over 105 generations. For w = 0 (no information about previous interactions), the p and
q values converge close to the rational solution S(0, 0); they are not exactly zero because mutation
introduces heterogeneity, and the best response to a heterogeneous population is not S(0, 0). For
increasing values of w, there is convergence close to the fair solution, S(1/2, 1/2), with q being
slightly smaller than p.
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